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INTRODUCTION
~=---- ==-~----=--=

Few men in the history of American business have been more contraversial than ,Jay Gould.

His accomplishments and failures left an indelible

mark on United States business life.

.~lthough

mudi has been written about

Gould's life and business career, no study has related a technical analysis
of the Southwestern rail stock price movements to his railroad ventures in
the

South\~estern

United States.

It is the purpose of this study to present

a historical review of Gould's acquisitions in the southwest and to explore
the implications of these ventures on the public and business sectors of
the American economy.

Utilizing stock price changes, the thesis attempts

to explain more fully the relationship of Gould's security trading practices
to his Southwestern rail road system.

Several technical patterns and inter-

pretati ons are analyzed and compared for an overa 11 view of his activities.
Preliminary investigation by this thesis indicates a high degree of correlation between the stock price changes and Gould's formation of the Southwestern railroad system.

Analysis of the moral implications of Gould's

business ventures does not come within the scope of this study.
In organizing the thesis, it was necessary to include only Gould's
Southwestern rail activities and his associated railroad investments.
Although many of Gould's purchases

~tere

simultaneous, the study analyzes

each acquisition separately in hope of avoiding confusion.
Sources containing business information on Jay Gould's activities
included Railway Review and Railway Gazette, which provide many details
on

south~1es tern

rai 1road events.

Newspapers such as the St. Louis Eveni n~

2

Chronicle, the Austin Daily Democratic.Statesman, and the Denver Tribune

i

g.__:..__

were used to portray Gould in view of his contemporaries.

Government

publications were valuahle especially in the areas of public policy and
its relationship to the railroads.

The Commercial and Financial Chronicle

was a valuable tool, as were the leading New York newspapers of the day.
Secondary sources were utilized when other information was not available
or obtainable.
In the last chapter, the study evaluates a comparable modern
railway problem and relates this analysis to Gould and his activities in
the Southwest. Hopefully, the result Nill be a greater understanding of
Jay Gould's achievements and failures.

F- _- -_-_
> -- _- ---§'!~=---- -=--:: __ _:-_-_:.:::-...::_-:_-::_-

CHAPTER I

If

·.

=:;;- ---- - :--------::;:;
!;;1::-=-==-~

-:::...--=---=-~

Feverish industrial and agricultural activity in the north during
the Civil War, aided by rising prices, touched off a period of unprecedented prosperity in the years immediately following the conflict.

Immense

regions in the west had been opened up to agriculture; the large wartime
profits had been invested freely in fixed forms of capital, notably transportation facilities.

Enormous amounts of invested capital financed 30,000

miles of newly constructed rail lines between 1867-73. However, the
prosperity was too rapid and the expenditures were too great for the
economic well-being of the country.

Cultivation of western lands only

threw older land areas out of production and consequently reduced their
value. Speculation ran rampant throughout the country.

Poor ethics of

politicians and capitalists, as witnessed by the Credit Mobilier and Black
Friday scandals, contributed to the weakening of business confidence.l
In the fall of 1873 the railroad bubble burst.

An eruption of

business failures occurred, culminating in the failure of Jay Cooke &Co.,
a leading Wall Street Firm. The New York Stock Exchange ceased trading
as a wave of selling hit the exchange.

By November, fifty-five railroads,

including the Kansas Pacific, the Santa Fe, and the Burlington,

~lith

securities representing one-eighth of the nation's total railroad debt,
were in default.
of business.

Industries related to the railroads failed for a lack

General iron and rail prices dropped 33 per cent and 27 per

lHarold Underwood Faulkner, American Economic History (New York:
Harper &Brothers Publishers, 1960), pp. 515-16.

---··-

4

cent respectively in one year.

The September panic and the five years of

national economy in the doldrums.2
By 1878 the economy had hit bottom and was beginning to recover.
With the rise in business activity, Jay Gould emerged as one of the nation's
Using methods which were without precedent, he

bought, sold, and traded his way to financial success.
Born in Roxbury, New York, in 1836, Jay Gould was the son of an
unsuccessful but determined pioneer who eeked out a living on a farm.
Impressed in his youth by the power and prestige of the Erie Railroad,
young Gould undoubtedly looked upon railroads as the most desirable
possessions of man.3 Fundamentally he was a hard worker who could pursue
a goal with patience and persuasiveness.
For several years, Gould roamed upper New York State, working,
saving, and making himself helpful and agreeable to those in strategic
places.

A self-styled promoter, he surveyed land, made a few maps, and

wrote a lurid history of Delaware County, New York.

However, it

~1as

in his

personal contacts, especially in a long and persistent cultivation of
retired tannery owner Zadoc Pratt, that he proved to be most successful.
Impressed by Gould's industry, Pratt financed the construction of a new
tannery in Pennsylvania and then turned the business over to Gould.

--

After

2Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era (Princeton:· Princeton University
Press, 1964), pp. 213,220-22,229.
3George Alfred Townsend, 'Oay Gould," Forum, II, 1886, pp. 88, 90.

--------

c__:
.:.:::;_-~-:-=:~~-:~

~-~
~:c_c_ ~

t;;-=: __-

depression which followed destroyed business confidence and left the

leading speculators.

""---

-

5

receiving only the briefest correspondence from Gould during a nationwide
boom in leather, Pratt unexpectedly visited the tannery.
astonishment, he found the books in utter chaos.

1'1uch to his

L
;~--~

-----

~

=::-:::c_:_-::-

E~---~:::=

Further inspection

revealed that Gould had misappropriated company funds for his own personal
use.

Pratt immediately demanded Gould resign.

The partnership was

peremptorily dissolved.4
However, Gould gained more than he lost.

Now well-known in the

leather industry from' his previous speculative trips to New York, he had
little trouble finding a new partner, Charles Leeup.

A prominent leather

merchant of unquestioned integrity, Leeup soon discovered that Gould was
using Leeup's name in an attempt to corner the market in hides.

The panic

of 1847 ruined Leeup financially and Gould's speculative ventures in hides
Betrayed by Gould and bankrupt, Charles Leeup shot himself in the

failed.

parlor of his New York mansion.

Thereafter, Gould moved to New York City
and entered the world of corporate finance. 5
For eight years Jay Gould labored on ~Jall Street with moderate success.
However, when he was elected to the Erie Railroad Board of Directors in
-

October, 1867, he was still virtually unknown in leading financial circles.

>-- -~--

-

.

Gould's abilities lay in the intricate field of corporate finance and
security trading although no one actually knows how he acquired his financial
skills and acumen. 6
4

4Hhittaker, H. R., ~Gould, Financier.
srbi d.

6Julius Grodinsky, ~Gould: His Business Career, 1867-1892.
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1967), p. 23. Hereafter
cited as Grodinsky, ~Gould.

----

--~---

----

6

An expert in corporate negotiation, Gould mastered more completely
than any other person the art of purchasing worthless stocks and bonds and
selling them to financially sound companies.? His usual practice was to
examine corporate leases, bonds, and charters for technical or legal weaknesses. Once he found useful information, he sought control and proceeded
to use the company information for personal profit. Taking advantage of
rising economic confidence during the years 1878-1881, Jay Gould successfully
ventured into the speculative and financially weak Southwestern railroads.
From the onset, Gould capitalized on the favorable circumstances of low
security prices and rising economic activity to form his Southwestern
System.
Gould also utilized the New York Stock Exchange whenever possible.
Speculation and security trading on the exchange was an important business
vocation and was certainly an important avenue for profit.

Non-speculators

regarded the exchange as an "immense gambling establishment."8
Proficient in corporate finance, Gould also mastered the complexities
of the national banking system and its relationship to the gold market.
By purchasing large amounts of gold in 1873, Gould reduced the amount of
gold in circulation causing a financial turmoil which became known as the
"Black Friday" panic.

Fearing an attempt on his life, he was protected

?Alexander Dana Noyes, Thirty Years of American Finance (New York:
C. P. Putnam's and Sons, 1901}, p. 63. Hereafter c1ted as Noyes, American
Finance.
8John F. Hume, "The Heart of Speculation," Forum, II (1886}, p. 131 •.
Hereafter cited as Hume, "Speculation."

1£:-c
....
t::t:=--- ------ ---

7
,-,

by a personal bodYguard for several years thereafter.9

~_::_____:___::_:_:_::___:_
&==--

Small in stature, Gould might walk the whole length of Broadway

~,=--,

__ --==

without being recognized by twenty persons except when he turned the
corner onto Wall Street. 10 Inconspicuous, Gould nevertheless commanded
respect.

~!illiam

H. Vanderbilt said of Gould:

"He always displays great

ability on whatever he may concentrate his attentions."ll
and unrestrained speech were all foreign to Jay Gould.

Violent temper

Like most specu-

lators, he kept his own counsel.
In considering the career of Jay Gould, one must recognize the
temper of his times.

Government regulation was minimal.

tariffs, and other government actions aided business.
adequate and funds were available for the entrepreneur.

Land grants, high

The labor supply was
This was the

"golden era of speculation" and "Mr. Gould was the busiest of them al1."12

9"Jay Gould," Railway Gazette, January 17, 1880, p. 33.
lO"Jay Gould," Railway Review, January 17, 1880, p. 32.
ll"Mr. Vanderbilt's Opinions," Railway Gazette, March 16, 1880,
p. 141.
~-~--

12Hume, Speculation, p. 135.
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CHAPTER II
THE GOULD VENTURES, 1878-1879
Eighteen hundred seventy-eight and eighteen hundred seventy-nine
proved to be two of the most remarkable years in the financial history of
the United States.

Prospects for prosperity loomed brighter than in any

year since the depression of 1873.1
Jay Gould, who gained considerable notoriety in trying to wrest
the Erie Railroad from the Vanderbilt interests in the years 1867 through
1872, succeeded in gaining control of the Union Pacific in 1873. Gould's
speculative interests next centered on the Kansas Pacific and other
financially weak western railroads.

The lines represented speculative

security profits if they could be united with a financially strong railroad, which meant to Gould his own Union Pacific.
Political turmoil lessened after the 1878 election. The defeat of
the "Greenback" and "Silver Inflation" congressional candidates was
decisive, and the gold standard resumed on January 1, 1879, without
incident.

Vast amounts of unoccupied western 1ands,

01~ned

by the govern-

ment and the railroads, sold briskly at low acreage prices. Settlers,
instead of land speculators, purchased a great number of these acres.
Large crops in 1879 coupled with a strong agricultural demand from Europe

l"Retrospect of 1878," Commercial and Financial Chronicle, January 4,
1879, p. 4.
~

,--------L __

-

10

brought farm prosperity which increased the attraction of settlement in
the West.2
Stock prices began to rise in 1878 with rail stocks leading as a
result of the large eastward movement of grain. The rise was orderly and
without speculative excesses. 3 As 1878 drew to a close, the stock market
ended

~lith

most of the issues on their highs for the year.
I.

THE KANSAS PACIFIC RAILROAD

As head of the Union Pacific, Jay Gould played a key role in the
affairs of the western railroads. Seeking to increase the earning power
of the Union Pacific, Gould tried to outflank the Chicago, Burlington
and Quincy, a line connecting the Union Pacific with Chicago, by purchasing
the Hannibal and St. Joseph. Stymied by the Burlington and unable to
obtain any security profits with his Union Pacific holdings, Gould started
to accumulate securities of the financially derelict Kansas Pacific, a
competitor to the Union Pacific, whose track connected Omaha, Nebraska,
with the Central Pacific Railroad in Utah.
Initially, every effort made by Gould to secure control of the
Kansas Pacific for his merger with the Union Pacific failed.

Henry Villard,

a financier who represented the Kansas Pacific's first mortgage bondholders,
opposed Gould's attempts to gain control. Searching for speculative profits

2Falkner, American Economic Histor,y, p. 518; "Retrospect of 1878,"
Commercial and F1nanc1al Chronicle, January 4, 1879, p. 3.
3"Retrospect, 1878," p. 5.

11

Gould purchased large amounts of Kansas Pacific junior income bonds at
prices as low as ten cents per $1.00 face value.4 Villard, meanwhile,
encouraged his clients to purchase the senior first mortgage bonds.5
After considerable negotiation, the Kansas City Pool Agreement, an
arrangement to harmonize the interests of the junior and senior bondholders, was signed by Gould, Villard, and other financiers.6
Despite the apparent agreement, Gould was for the moment stymied
in his efforts to gain further concessions from the Kansas Pacific.
Lacking capital for a more concerted attack on the Kansas Pacific and
other railroads, Gould decided to sell a major portion of his Union
Pacific stock to secure additional funds.

Of the 370,000 shares of Union

Pacific stock outstanding, Jay Gould controlled 200,000.

Ho~tever,

any

large scale selling by Gould would have depressed the price of Union
Pacific stock very rapidly.? Gould, however, found a way to sell his
stock without depressing the price.

An announcement signified the "great
----

event of the week in Hall Street": Jay Gould had sold 50,000 shares of
Union Pacific stock to a syndicate led by his friend Russell Sage, along
with an option to purchase an additional 50,000 shares on ca11.8
4united States Congress, Senate, United States Pacific Railwa
Commission Report: 1887, Vol. 1, 50th Congress, 1st Session, Has ington:
Government Printing Office, 1880), p. 463. Hereafter cited as Pacific
Railway Report: 1887. See Appendix, Tables I and II for the composition
of the Kansas Ci~ool Agreement.
5Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 141.
6Pacific Railway Report: 1887, p. 51.
7Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 162.
8commercial and Financial Chronicle, Februa~y 28, 1879, p. 200.

12
Now ready, Gould pursued his attack on the status quo in the western rail-

E
~-~--

__-,-:,_--==-'-=

~-

roads.

In effect, Gould sold his Union Pacific stock to purchase Habash

F
i' --

and Kansas Pacific stock and form a competitive system to the Union
Pacific.

The ultimate goal •Has a merger that would provide security

profits.
The attack began with Gould's efforts to purchase the !vabash
Railroad primarily because of its strategic location as a potential
eastern outlet for the Kansas Pacific.

It was the only railroad that had
a line from Toledo, Ohio, to St. Louis, Missouri. 9 Also, as the Railway
Gazette later reported, the acquisition of the Wabash would enable Gould
to harmonize the Habash interests with those of the Union Pacific. 10

However, a difficult corporate problem confronted Gould.

Commodore

C. K. Garrison, seeking to establish a system of his own, and therefore an
opponent of Gould's,controlled the Missouri Pacific, the \•Jabash, and a
feeder 1i ne, the St. Louis, Kansas City, and Northern.

Vii th Garrison's

seemingly strong strategic position, the Habash seemed an unlikely recipient
for Gould's interest and money. 11 In an effort to strengthen his position

~"-~~~~
~

--

-----

against Garrison, Gould purchased control of the Central Branch Union
Pacific, a feeder line to the Kansas Pacific and by traffic interchange to
the Missouri Pacific and

~-!abash.

The purchase was a double blow to Gould's

9Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 194.
lOApril 23, 1880, p. 220.
llcommercial and Financial Chronicle, February 22, 1879, p. 200.
==------~-~-

13

opponents in the Hest.

Gould not only increased his bargaining position

E---""-----------__--_-----::_-_-~-,--:

with the financially derelict Kansas Pacific, but also effectively
stopped Garrison's plan to expand the Missouri Pacific west from Kansas
City into Kansas.

Pressed further by declining stock prices and law

suits, Garrison sold his interest in the Wabash to Gould.
In addition to the purchase of the Habash, Gould acquired 40,300
shares of the 100,000 shares of Kansas Pacific stock outstanding.l2
Attempting to end his continuing differences with financier Henry Villard
who at this time was threatening the Kansas Pacific with foreclosure,
Gould agreed to pay all interest arrearages to Villard and the senior
bondholders and then as the largest single

securi~y

holder, he took control

of the''Kansas Pacific.
Seeking profits for his Kansas Pacific holdings through a merger,
Gould, as head of the Kansas Pacific, suggested combining the Union Pacific
and the Kansas Pacific.

Rebuffed by the Union Pacific Board of Directors

Gould demonstrated his brilliance as a railroad strategist and tactician. 13

-----------

Unable to reach St. Louis or Denver, the Union Pacific had to consider the
frightening prospect of insolvency if both the Kansas Pacific and Union
Pacific competed for the same traffic in the sparsely settled area.

Gould,

realizing the Union Pacific's position, purchased the Denver Pacific,
thereby 1inking the Kansas Pacific's Denver terminus with Cheyenne and

1.2Pacific Railway Report:

1887, p. 463.

13Gould became a minority stockholder through his Union Pacific
sale to the Sage syndicate. Although he was still on the Board of Directors,
his influence had declined as a result of the sale.

------------

14
cutting into Union Pacific feeder traffic.

At the same time Gould also
s=--

became an important influence in the Denver, South Park and Pacific, a

~::_-:-:

_:-:-.,------,------

road that had access to the Colorado mine traffic.14 Continuing his
attacks against the Union Pacific, Gould proposed to extend the Kansas
Pacific to Oregon.

llith the Union Pacific on the defensive, Gaul d waited

for an offer of merger. As he had foreseen, the Union Pacific capitulated
during the negotiations that ensued.

Gould was in the enviable position

of both buyer and seller since he still owned a small block of Union
Pacific stock.
Vlhen the merger was announced, profits were reaped by many who
held Kansas Pacific and other branch line securities which were exchanged
for high quality Union Pacific securities. However, as Vincent M.
Masterson has commented, "It was to Gould, as the chief owner of the
Kansas Pacific and holder of the Denver Pacific stock outstanding, that
the lion's share of the profits went."

Gould had purchased the Kansas

Pacific stock for as little as $12.50 a share as early as 1871, while
the Denver Pacific stock was obtained at no cost with the purchase of
DP.nver Pacific Bonds.15
Gould's strategy included the formation of a new corporation with
a capital stock equal to the sum of the stocks of the old constituent
14Arthur ~1. Johnson and Barry E. Supple, Boston Ca italists and
~/estern Railroads, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967 , p:-2"43.
Hereafter cited as Johnson, Western Rail roads.
15racifi c Railway Report:

1887, p. 559.

---

15
companies--The Union Pacific, Kansas Pacific, and Denver Pacific.16 The

¥~-'--t=<----

~--::---c-::-===--

exchange of the old securities was on a dollar-for-dollar basis for
stocks of the new corporation.

In essence, the Union Pacific diluted its

earning power and credit with the exchange of Union Pacific securities for
the virtually worthless securities of the Kansas Pacific and Denver
Pacific.
II.

THE ST.LOUIS, KANSAS CITY AND NORTHERN

Prior to the merger of the Kansas Pacific and the Union Pacific,
Gould completed a small consolidation that reportedly netted him profits
of $4,800,000.17 When Gould took control of the Wabash, he privately
purchased large blocks of the St. Louis, Kansas City, and Northern stock.
The common stock sold at $7.50 and the preferred stock at $30.00 a share
prior to Gould's acquisition of the Habash.

In July, 1879, the Wabash
announced the consolidation of the two lines. 18 When the merger news
became public, the price of the common and preferred stocks were $47.00 and
$72.00 respectively.l9
III.

THE POTENTIAL RAILROAD MONOPOLY

Early in 1880 the Austin Daily Democratic Statesman stated,

16Johnson, Western Railroads, p. 249.
17"The Gould Speculations," Railway Gazette, April 23, 1880, p. 217.
Hereafter cited as "Gould Speculations."
18commercial and Financial Chronicle, July 12, 1879, p. 42.
l9"Gould Speculations,'' p. 217. See also Appendix Table III.

§_ __

~---

16
"Gould's great object seems to be the control of the transcontinental
trade. u20 11ith the vJabash and Kansas Pacific mergers completed, Gould
cast his eyes on the fragmented Southwestern railroads.

By acquiring the

strategically located but unaffiliated railroads, and by building the
necessary lines to link them into a system, he could forge a transportation monopoly'in the Southwest.

During the next two years, he

proceeded to turn these dreams into reality.

20January 21, 1880, p. 2.

Hereafter cited as the Daily Statesman.

L··

'""'·-._

I \

I

q

:::,~~\'"

''P

'

i J..:'i

"4

I\·---:.--:_-- .
~ \7 \~

.

\

\ '.

'--J

)
.. -, ~<

\J-P

\

WI

\
Jl''

&[0

0.,

~--::~

0 .. ,...'00

~

/1rr"v

. '·

~

it. ·-L-~-· ·1~ ~

..

. ~'

..

_:....__

,

,,~·.,
- ...
,.~···

- _8J' - ·

~
•• > " M'____:

•

________,"

'·· • :_~,S'__

.. - -

""

....,
~

THE SOUTHWESTERN RAILROADS

1878
Table of Cities

= Proposed

Construction
:1:.:.,

::rn·.

It
:1·11

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
li.

llri.IJL,

'Cans as City
Hannibal
St. Louis
Dennison

(e) Texarkana (i)
(f) Shreveport ( j)
(g) Nm1 Orleans(k)
(h) Galveston (1)

lil'i
1
1

i

II

1
- '

II

!

·I!

El Paso
Taylor
'I'

'1'.1 II. '·. II', '(I ,.,I.,
'I',' f1 !, ', ',
'11''1 ·Ill'
''•I'
'I
I'I '

I :1

I

II' '

, til '1:1' ,!
•• •. •.••.·· •. ·•. ·.l'•l··l
'''''I·· I·

Ft. Worth
La redo

: !i!

I

:r:l, li!

!

•!

I

't'

11

!

;

I
II

CHAPTER III
THE SOUTHVJESTERN SYSTEM, 1879-1880
During the year 1879, the railroad picture in the southwest began
to change very rapidly with the entry of Jay Gould.

"The conquest was

rapid," said Julius Grodinsky, "indeed in American history there had
been probably no"other system built in such a short time."l By the end
of 1880 Jay Gould became the dominant factor in Southwestern railroad
activity.
I.

THE

~1ISSOURI

PACIFIC RAILROAD

On May 12, 1849, the Missouri General Assembly chartered the Pacific
Railroad of Missouri to build a line from St. Louis to a point on the
western border of the State.

James Kirkwood, a noted engineer of the

period, completed the surveys for the route.

Construction commenced on

the first section of the railroad to Cheltenham, Missouri, a distance of
five miles, on July 14, 1851.

Passenger service to Cheltenham began on

December 9, 1852.2
With the onset of the Ci vi1 Vlar tn 1861, Pacific Rail road
construction temporarily ceased. The lines western terminus was then at
Sedalia, ninety-five miles from the proposed western border.

Building

activity began anew just before the war ended and the last ninety-five
1Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 244.
2Moody's Transportation Manual, (New York: Robert H. Messner, 1968),
p. 279. Hereafter cited as Moody's Manual.

miles were completed to Kansas City.

19
Construction resumed after the Civil

,.--o

v/ar, and the rai 1road soon extended to Leavenworth and Atchison. 3
After considerable financial difficulty, the railroad was acquired
by a group of eastern financiers, led by Commodore C. K. Garrison.
Thereafter the railroad reorganized as the Missouri Pacific Railway.
Coinciding with the purchase of the Missouri Pacific, Garrison also
acquired the Wabash Railroad, the only railroad leading to St. Louis from
the northeast, and the St. Louis, Kansas City, and Northern.

It was

against Garrison's enviable position in the Southwest that Jay Gould
leveled his attack in 1879.4
Gould soon confronted Garrison with lawsuits and other tactics
designed to end Garrison's hold over the Habash.

With Gould's purchase

of the Central Branch Union Pacific, Garrison gave up his efforts to unite
and expand his raHroads.

The l!/abash and other Garrison controlled rail-

roads soon passed to Gould.
After Gould successfully purchased the Habash and the St. Louis,
Kansas City, and Northern, he offered to purchase the Missouri Pacific
from Garrison.

During testimony before the United States Pacific Rail-

way Commission in 1887, Gould gave the following description of his
dealings with Garrison: "Mr. Garrison had projected roads out in the
Kansas Pacific territory paralleling it to an extent, and I went and
saw him and had a story session or b/0. ,.5
3Ibid., p. 279.
4see Chapter II.
5Pacific Railway Report: 1887, p. 509.

----
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Throughout these "stormy sessions" with Garrison, Gould threatened
~

to extend the Kansas Pacific as far east as Garrison extended the Hissouri
Pacific west.

The threats were a typical Gould tactic.

'=------==

After Gould

purchased the Central Branch 'Union Pacific, which had been vital to
Garrison's expansion plans, Garrison decided to sell the

~1issouri

Pacific.

Gould quoted Garrison as saying, "You had better buy me out; that is the
cheapest way." 6 However, Gould still had problems. Garrison rejected
the first offer on the grounds it was too low.

When Gould decided to

accept a higher figure, the Commodore raised the ante.

Finally the price

agreed upon was $3,800,000--approximately $1,800,000 higher than the
original asking price.? Control of the road passed to Jay Gould on
November 13, 1879.8
Included in the sale of the Missouri Pacific were two small branch
lines and an option to purchase the narrow-gaage Kansas Central Railroact. 9
Hhen Gould proposed to unite the Kansas Pacific with the Union Pacific, he
had acquired the Missouri Pacific, Kansas Pacific,

~Jabash,

and several

smaller rail lines, which, when linked together, formed a system competing
with the Union Pacific. Only then did the real significance of the

6Ibid., p. 509.
7Henry Clews, Fifty Years in Wall Street (New York: Irving Publishing
House, 1908), p. 646.
--8In testimony in 1887, Gould stated that he paid $3,000,000 for 4,000
shares of Missouri Pacific stock. However, since the actual price was not
disclosed at the time of the sale, the financial papers generally accepted
the $3,800,000 figure.
9see Appendix Table IV.

----
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~~i ssouri

Pacific purchases become apprent. The Missouri Pacific was the

cornerstone and the eastern outlet for the newly formed system.

"His

co,lleagues in the Union Pacific management were informed that it was his
purpose to carry his enterprise to the Pacific Ocean." 10 \~i th this
objective in view the extraordinary purchases of the Missouri Pacific, at
prices which did not bear any relation to the value of the properties,
could readily be explained.ll
An interview between Gould and the Union Pacific management was held
on January 14, 1880, and a subsequent agreement was drawn up.

The negotiations ~1ere "a speedy but complete surrender to his demands." 12 Referring
to the merger, the New York Times stated:

"Gould succeeded in managing

the matter pretty conclusively."l3 To the general public, Gould had seemingly changed from a speculator to a railroad manager.l4

II. THE TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILROAD
----

After completion of the merger between the Kansas Pacific and
the Union Pacific, Gould sought control of the Texas Pacific, the second
railroad he desired for his future Southwestern system. The Texas Pacific

lDPacific Raihqay Report: 1887, pp. 60-61
llrbi d.
merger.

12rbid. See Appendix, Tables V-VII for further details of the
13"Gould's Great Monopoly," New York Times, January 20, 1880, p. 1.
14commercial and Financial Chronicle, January 10, 1880, p. 30.
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[~

origin ally had been planned and promoted by one of the ablest groups of
""----

railroad capitalists in the country.

In the early 1870's, T.

A. Scott,

~----- -:.:==~=

with the help of an eastern group of financiers as well as a land grant,
had p1an ned a rail road to run from the Louisiana-Texas border to San
Diego, California.

The depression of the 1870's, however, ended all

construction outside of Texas, and the Texas and Pacific fai 1ed to
accomplish its projected construction program by 1879. 15

In 1880, the

main line extended from Shreveport, Louisiana, to Fort vlorth, Texas, and
from Texarkana, Texas, to Sherman, Texas.

Adding other minor lines, the

=

total track was 444 miles. 16
Unable to obtain either Congressional help or public financing on
the open market, the Texas

&Pacific turned to Jay Gould. Early in 1880

the Railway Review announced the organization of the Pacific Improvement
Company, the construction company which would complete the Texas & Pacific
Railroad. 17 tvith a paid-in capital of $1,000,000 stock control of the
Pacific Improvement Company rested with the following speculators:

General

Dodge, G. Morrosini, E. L. Adams, G. N. Pullman, 11. L. Scott, C. F.
!ioerishieffer, Gould associates Sidney Dillon and Russell Sage, and Jay
Gould. 18
The newly formed syndicate planned to complete a line from Fort
15Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 253.
16 Raih1ay Gazette, August 3, 1880, p. 436.
l7January 3, 1880, p. 5.
18Railway Review, January 10, 1880, p. 18; New York Times, January
6, 1880, p. 4.

t ___ _
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in completing the line.

s,

Taking advantage of his success with the Texas

Pacific, Gould had "New Orleans rejoicing in the prospect" that a

rail road 11oul d be built from the city of Shreveport.

At a meeting of the

Board of Directors on April 10, 1880, Gould and Scott completed terms.
Although all parties "hoped for" a quick commencement of construction, it
wasn't until July 17, 1880, that a contract was let to the Gould-sponsored
construction company.
23
in eighteen months.

The contract stipulated that the rail line be completed

Creditors, in the meantime, consented to be paid at
fifty cents on the dollar. 24 In one stroke, Jay Gould had eliminated
one half of the outstanding debt.
Control of the railroad rested with the original owners until such
time as forty miles of track were laict. 25

Then according to the construction

agreement, sufficient amounts of stock would be transferred to the syndicate
to control the railroad.
In an effort to obtain greater profits, Gould sought to transfer an
additional land grant to the New Orleans Pacific from the New Orleans,
Baton Rouge, and Vicksburg Railroad.

Commonly referred to as the "Backbone,"

the Vicksburg line supposedly lost its land grant before it completed road
construction.

However, Gould discovered that the lands had been illegally

withdrawn and still were held in reserve. 26

He reached an agreement with

23 Railway Review, April 17, 1880, p. 184.
24 commercial and Financial Chronicle, p. 434.
25Raihlay Gazette, July 23, 1880, p. 402.
26

George H. Julian, "Railway Influence in the Land Office," North
American Review (New York: 1883), p. 253.

!:'7---

23
Horth, Texas, to El Paso, Texas, by January 1, 1883. The railroad agreed
to pay the syndicate the costs of construction by issuing first mortgage

c-~--

bonds to them at $20,000 per mile, and as a bonus, an equal amount of
stock.19 \4ith the stock market rising late in 1879 and continuing through
1880, the securities paid to the syndicate proved to be very profitable.
Eventually the syndicate reaped a profit of 700 per cent.20
Thomas A. Scott reported to the Texas

&

Pacific stockholders a

few months later in 1880 that the road had a surplus of $3,000,000 in first
mortgage bonds, $600,000 of income bonds and land grant bonds, and no
floating debt.

"This r,eserve of securities will not only insure a well-

constructed and fully equipped road, but will enable your company to
maintain the very strong financial condition which it now enjoys," said
T. A. Scott.21 Jay Gould had similar thoughts; by the time the Texas &
Pacific stockholders met again, he was president of the line.22
III.

THE NE\4 ORLEANS PACIFIC RAILROAD
--~

Dormant for years, the New Orleans Pacific consisted in 1880 of
100 miles of roadbed and a land grant.

There was little hope of completion

until 1880 when Gould and fellow financier, T. A. Scott, announced interest
19New York Times, Janu,ary 6, 1880, p. 4.
20New York Times, January 10, 1885.
21Railway Gazette, July 23, 1880, p. 402; Railwav Review, August
21, 1880, p. 430.
22Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 256.

----~--
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W. L Scott, the largest shareholder, to pool a majority of the Bacl<bone's

w~=:'C~.:'-:::'':_--=-='::-c::-

stock and to transfer the land grant to the New Orleans Pacific.

p-

~--

H--

Eventually the 1and grant passed to the construction company. 27
Although the New Orleans Pacific was supposedly easy to build
because of its location, construction difficulties soon arose. 28 According
to contemporary reports, "unprecendented cold weather" and the "scarcity of
experienced 1abor" hindered progress. 29 However, by December, 1880, the
railroad announced that it would commence operation over its lines except
for the last uncompleted seventy-five miles. 30 After the announcement, the
Gou1d-infl!Aenced Board of Directors proposed the consolidation of the 1 ine
with the Texas & Pacific, thereby 1inking Texas with New Orleans. 31 The
effect of such a report only increased the enthus'iasm of Texas businessmen
who considered New Orleans an "admirable base" for supplying the Lone
Star State with a great many heavy goods. 32 Future business and railroad
expansion prospects were exceedingly bright as Jay Gould expanded his
Southwestern Empire.
IV.

THE MISSOURI, KANSAS AND TEXAS RAILROAD

Consisting of a line from Holden, Missouri, to Paola, Kansas, and
27Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 258; New York Times, January 10, 1885.
28Railway Gazette, July 23, 1880, p. 402.
29Ibid., ~1ay 6, 1881, p. 254.
30Daily Statesman, December 22, 1880, p. 1.
31Railway Gazette, December 3, 1880, p. 652.
32oaily Statesman, June 27, 1880, p. 2; Railway Gazette, August 13,
1880, p. 436.

26
a line from Parsons, Kansas, to Junction City, Kansas, the Missouri,
Kansas &Texas covered a total of 786 miles. However, despite its

~:;---==----"-'='-='u----------- ----~

-

~--

E::

excellent location, the road fell into receivership during the depression
of the 1870's.

Reorganization 1as ted only a short time and was succeeded

by a unique scheme arising out of financial necessity.33 Control of the
line did not pass to the stockholders as is normal after receivership.
Rather, the property was placed in trust under an agreement with the Union
Trust Company of New York.34 The railroad issued income bonds for the
past due interest and the floating debt. 35

- - -

The Missouri, Kansas and Texas was vital to Gould's growing system
in the Southwest.

But before he could gain control of the rail line, he

had to battle C. E. Perkins, manager of the Burlington and Quincy Railroad,
who considered the Missouri, Kansas & Texas as a natural extension of
the Burlington.

In the late 1870's Perkins launched the Burlington on an

expansion program 11hich carried the line into Colorado, Nebraska, and
Hyoming.

The clash with Gould became inevitable as Gould secured the

c=--------

"

---

Missouri Pacific, the Wabash and other lines thus invading Burlington
territory and earning power.

Gould's efforts to control the Missouri,

Kansas &Texas produced a quick but spectacular fight.

Although Perkins

-------

considered the common stock to be worthless because of the large bonded
debt, Gould began to buy until he purchased a majority interest. Then
33Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 234.
34New York Daily Tribune, January 28, 1880, p. 8.
35Railway Gazette, November 12, 1880, p. 599,
-------

27
he tendered $800,000, together with the $250,000 cash in the railroad's
treasury to the Union Trust Company to pay for the defaulted interest
coupons. 36 With the defaulted interest paid, control could pass to the
stockholders.

Gould immediately demanded the return of the company to the

stockholders and as the dominate stockholder took control of the company
in January, 1880. 37 Thus Gould eliminated the Burlington's opportunity
. to control the
V.

~1issouri,

Kansas & Texas.

THE INTERNATIONAL GREAT NORTHERN RAILROAD

The International Great Northern Railroad was promoted by a group
of New York Capitalists and planned as a through route to the Rio Grande
from Longview, Texas, to Laredo, Texas. The International fell victim to
the financial crisis of 1873.

Construction ceased while the road was

still many miles from its intended goal in

south~testern

Texas.

Lacking

the necessary capital, the line failed to complete its construction within
---

the time limits specified by the charter.

Expansion plans began to revive

in 1880 when the State of Texas instituted law suits to relieve the State
from its obligations incurred under the provisions of the land grant. 38
In an effort to retain its land grant, the International Great Northern
commenced construction on a line to San Antonio in July, 1880.
36 commercial and Financial Chronicle, November 12, 1880, p. 510.
37New York Daily Tribute, January 28, 1880, p. 8.
38Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 261.

28
Rumors of Jay Gould's interest appeared suddenly in December, 1880.
At first the rumors were denied by sources close to the railroad.

However,

-~ =
t1:--=--'

----

"

~--

the rumors proved to be true; Gould purchased control of the road in
December, 1880, and now possessed all the rail lines leading to St. Louis
except the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern.39 The Iron Mountain
was the next road to fall into Gould's hands.
VI.

THE ST. LOUIS, I RON MOUNTAIN AND SOUTHERN RAILROAD

Originally formed in 1837 by Missouri financiers, the St. Louis &
Bellevue

~Hneral

Railroad, as it was originally called, was rechartered

in 1851 under the name St. Louis, I ron

~1ountai n

and Southern.

It had the

distinction of being the first railroad to be surveyed west of the Missouri
River .• although construction was slow.

Business commenced between St.

Louis and Pilot Knob in 1858. A $3,501,000 loan from the State of Missouri
during this period enabled the company to meet its construction obligations.
Defaulting on its interest payments in September, 1866, control of the
line passed to the State of Missouri who operated the company through a
Board of Commissioners for three months.4°
On January 12, 1867, Thomas Allen, the future president of the
line purchased the railroad and promised to extend the rail lines to
---

39oaily Statesman, May 12, 1880. p. 2.
40Railway Review, Dei!jember 18, 1880, p. 664.

-

--

"----~-
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Columbus, Kentucky, 41 and to expend $500,000 per year for five years on
improvements or extensions. 42 Confirmation of Allen's title to the railroad came only after considerable litigation. However, the line prospered
and grew steadily under Allen's control.
By the middle of 1880, Gould challenged Allen's control of the
Iron Mountain

by

his Southwestern rail purchases.

Much to his dismay,

Allen saw his line effectively surrounded by Gould-controlled railroads.
During Gould's negotiations for the Missouri Pacific, Allen had foreseen
Gould's motives and had advised Commodore Garrison to buy the Missouri,

L~

--------

l(ansas & Texas and to merge the 1i ne into the Missouri Pacific. However,
Garrison declined Allen's advice; eventually Gould completed the purchase
of the Missouri, Kansas &Texas. 43
Interchange traffic between the Iron Mountain and the Texas and
Pacific soon faced an uncertain future as the Texas line began to expand
. lines west1qard. 44 Allen considered the Gould-formed Pac1f1c
.. I mprove1ts
ment Company as adverse to the interests of the Iron Mountain. 45 During
December, 1880, negotiations took place between Gould and Allen to harmonize
41 The actual agreement read to extend the line to Columbus, Kentucky,
or a point on the r1ississippi River just opposite or below.
42Railway Review, December 18, 1880, p. 664.
43Ibid.
44Ibid., April 10, 1880, p. 176.

c:: __ _

45Ibid., December 18, 1880, p. 664.
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the interests of both railroads. 46 However, "the combined money and
influence of a combination such as that of Messrs. Gould, Sage, Dillon,
and their associates" frightened Allen.

F--~~-~:;:;_~

~-

-

r:;--

Elected to the United States

Senate in November, Allen decided to sell the Iron Mountain to prevent,
in his words, "quarrels" and to secure "harmony" among the railroads
that entered St. Louis.47
Gould purchased 40,000 shares from Allen and 20,000 shares from
Henry C. Marquand, the Vice-President of the Iron Mountain. Other small
purchases brought Gould's holdings to 70,000 shares--slightly short of an
absolute majority.

However, the amount was sufficient to give Gould
control over the road. 48 Gould now dominated all of the main railroads
leaving St. Louis to the Southwest.
VII.

THE GALVESTON, HOUSTON AND HENDERSON RAILROAD

In December, 1871, the Galveston, Houston, and Henderson, a small
line that had access to the port of Galveston, came out of reorganization
with a funded debt of $1,500,000 and a capital stock valued at $1,500,000.
Like so many strategically located railroads, the small Galveston Line
had long been in financial trouble, and Gould saw a new opportunity to
---

46Evening Chronicle (St. Louis, Missouri}, December 13, 1880, p. 2;
New York Daily Tribune, December 14, 1880, p. 5; Railway Gazette, December
u, 1880, p. 678.
47Railway Review, December 18, 1880, p. 664.
48commercial and Financial Chronicle, December 26, 1880, p. 653;
New York Daily Tribuiie;"" December 16, 1880, p. 1; Railway Review, December
18, 1880, p. 664.

--
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expand his system and gain a.ccess to the port. A large floating (non-

@~_-::

--

t;---;o;---

~~ith

funded) debt existed for several years.

his friend Russell Sage,

Gould purchased a majority of the outstanding mortgage bonds.

!'" --

As majority

bondholders, they elected themselves as trustees for the line and then
foreclosed and bought the property at the sale. Eventually the International Great Northern leased the Galveston line. Gould now possessed
"the great terminal link to Galveston."49

* * * * * * *
Jay Gould in less than three years formed a railroad system by
exchanging his Union Pacific interests for the financially weak western
rail lines.

Combining the western lines into competitive system, Gould

threatened the Union Pacific with ruinous competition.

Facing possible

insolvency, the Union Pacific bowed to Gould's pressure and agreed to his
merger terms. This resulted in large profits for Gould when the merger
-------

was consummated.

Then using these profits he purchased the Missouri

Pacific and Wabash lines and expanded into the southwest, thus forming his
Southwestern System. However, the system still needed to be expanded and
consolidated before it was completed.

In one more year, Gould completed

the system and in doing so established a railroad monopoly in the Southwest.50
49 commercial and Financial Chronicle, July 10, 1881, p. 45; March
19, 1881, p. 312; Grodinsky, ~Gould, pp. 265-66; Railway Gazette, July
16, 1880, p. 386.
50 Noyes, American Finance, p. 64. See also Appendix, Tables VIIIXV for details concerning the railroads discussed in Chapter III.
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THE

SOUTH\~ESTERN

p. .----

SYSTEM, 1880-1881

Established as a powerful railroad figure in the Southwest, Jay
Gould

sa\~

an optimistic business world in the years 1880-1881.

Railroad

expansion increased and to Gaul d this meant further speculative profits
in the Southwest.
I.

ST. LOlliS AND COI1PLIMENTARY INVESTMENTS

St. Louis was headquarters for the Missouri Pacific, the cornerstone
in the Gould Southwestern Railroad System.

From St. Louis the rumors

eminated far and wide on activities concerning the Southwestern System.
St. Louis accepted the Gould influence with optimism.

"Control by

Jay Gould of the Southwestern system of railroads will prove to be a good
thing for St. Louis," stated the Evening Chronicle. 1 Gould's non-railroad
---- ---

investments enhanced the city's efforts to make the St. Louis a major
commercial center.

In 1880, Gould purchased two barge lines between St.
Louis and New Orleans. 2 Consolidation of the two lines occurred soon after
with a combined capital of $3,000,000 an increase of $1,200,000.

The

consolidated barge line consisted of twenty-three tugs and 149 barges with
an 8,000,000 bushel capacity. 3

P. 1.

loecember 18, 1880, p. 1
2The Daily Gazette, (Colo~ado Springs, Colorado), August 12, 1880,
Hereafter cited as the Da1l y Gazette.
3 Railway Review, August 27, 1880, p. 466.

=-~-=~
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Many citizens felt the city was "adapted for the focus of a vast

\!!#:_~c_
····~~~
--------- -~-------

trade if the railroads but work for her interest." The Evening Chronicle

~-

expressed the opinion: "St. Louis could become a shipping port for grain
to Europe." 4 The statements were not without foundation. Control of the
barge lines enabled Gould to by-pass the railroads east of the Mississippi
and to ship directly to New Orleans at lower freight rates.

In January,

not only was grain backed up in St. Louis for lack of storage, but an
additional three hundred cars full of grain stood on the rail line to
St. Louis. The grain awaited storage and eventual trans-shipment. 5
Other Gould investments included an interest in the Vulcan Steel
Works, which provided the Southwestern System with a source of new rails. 6
Across the river from St. Louis, Gould purchased a share in the cattle
stockyards and activated several coal mines in the Indian Territory
(Oklahoma) for locomotive fuel.?
To St. Louis Gould was the great railroad man she always wanted. 8
Seemingly, whenever Jay Gould visited St, Louis, rumors began to spread. 9

---

4oecember 18, 1880, p. 1.
5Evening Chronicle, January 17, 1881, p. 2.
6rbid., February 8, 1881, p. 2.
7Railway Review, August 27, 1881, p. 476.
8Evening Chronicle, December 18, 1880, p. 1.
9In the west, the Denver Tribune wrote about the interest generated
by Jay Gould: "It is believed that Jay Gould will surpass Vanderbilt as
Railroad King." This followed an earlier statement from the same source
boasting that Denver wquld become one of the great railroad centers in the
United States. Denver, November 18; November 23, 1880.

----
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His visits were known to have caused many to stir uneasily as the rumors

i'!'.o_~-,__:_~==---=-=
-- ---------

tL ---

of management changes and new investments circulated around St. Louis.

A

~~

local paper reported that "Every man connected 11ith Gould lines in the
city" (was) "so nervous that it required on their part the greatest
heroism to dispose of routine business." 10 Because of his continued
success in South1vestern rail affairs and his complimentary rail investments,
Gould exerted a substantial influence over the St. Louis econolllY. 11
II.

THE ILLINOIS AND ST. LOIJIS BRIDGE COMPANY

---

-

During the early part of 1881, Gould sought to control the
St. Louis Bridge Company.

'lith its bridge and tunnel properties, the

Bridge Company connected St. Louis and the east bank of the Mississippi
River, and thus was vital to the Missouri Pacific as an eastern outlet to
the vJabash.

Gould advertised that construction would soon begin on a new

bridge across the Mississippi River which would bypass the St. Louis Company
property.

vlith a large bonded debt and with little earnings since its

------

founding, the company quickly acceded to Gould's construction threat by
leasing the bridge and tunnel properties jointly to the \'Jabash and the
Missouri Pacific.

Gould then enhanced the va 1ue of the Bridge Company's
seemingly worthless common stock by adjusting the interchange tolls. 12
Coinciding with the acquisition of the St. Louis Bridge Company, Gould
lOEvening Chronicle, t~arch 1, 1881, p. 2.
llGrodinsky, ~Gould, pp. 340-341.
12Grodinsky, ~Gould, pp. 338-340; Railway Review, June 25, 1881,
p. 350.

r====
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proceeded to expand the Southwestern System.
t---- -- -- ----

II I.

THE SOUTHHESTERN SYSTEM EXPANSION PLANS, 1881

The Southwestern System announced in January, 1881, a construction
and consolidation program of one thousand miles. 13 Under Gould's direction
the Iron

~1ountain

gave up its goal of extending its lines southward into

Texas from Texarkana, the International was stopped at Longview, Texas,
and the Texas &Pacific at Texarkana, Texas, thus making each of these
railroads a feeder to the others rather than a competitor.

Gould then

directed their construction energies toward extending the International
southwest through San Antonio to Laredo and the Texas &Pacific westward
to El Paso and eastward to New Orleans.

The Missouri Pacific extended

westward into Kansas while the Iron Mountain pushed toward Arkansas.14
Gould envisioned another transcontinental railroad being built to the
Pacific coast.

However, as the Texas & Pacific expanded westward to11ard

El Paso, Gould met a formidable opponent in Collis P. Huntington, 1qho was
expanding his Southern Pacific eastward from California.

"It would be

folly to believe after the Southern Pacific reaches El Paso, that it

~1il1

disband its perfectly organized working force," asserted the Austin, Texas,
Daily Statesman. 15 To forestall the advance of the Southern Pacific, Gould
instituted a suit against the Southern Pacific to prohibit the use of the
13 see Appendix, Table XVI.
14Moody's Manual, p. 279.
15september 24, 1880, p. 2.

~--~~-
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right of wqy between Yuma and El Paso. Trying to bring more pressure on
"-"---

Huntington, Gould sought help from the Union Pacific, the Atlantic &
Pacific, and the Atchison, Topeka &Santa Fe in organizing a united front
to invade California with a rail line through Northern Arizona.l6 Hith
2,500 men employed in laying Texas &Pacific's rails westward, the Gould
lines and his new allies were a significant threat to Huntington's
17
California railroad monopoly.
Huntington understood the nature of his opponent completely.
Reportedly he once said:

"I wouldn't go into the stock market against Gould

for he would whip me at the game but when it comes to building and operating
railroads in the most efficient and economical way, I can beat him, for
that is 11\Y business." 18 To offset Gould's threat, Huntington threatened
to expand the Centra 1 Pacific into l!ni on Pacific territory and bypass the
Union Pacific completely. 19 Jarred by this counterattack, Gould halted his
contruction plans and called a meeting to reconcile their differences.
In January, 1882, Huntington and Gould reached an agreement. They jointly
purchased slightly less than fifty per cent of the St. Louis &San Francisco,
a line that was expanding in Missouri, Arkansas, and Northern Texas. The

16Railway Review, August 20, 1881, p. 462.
17Ibid., September 3, 1881, p. 492.
18oscar Lewis, The Bin Four, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928),
p. 220.
=-.:..;;L - -

19Huntington controlled the Central Pacific while Gould still had
an important interest in the Union Pacific by virtue of the Kansas PacificUnion Pac ific merger.

~ ----

----

F--~

37

purchase eliminated any threat to Gould's lines and Gould's threat to
~

invade California as the "Frisco" controlled the Atlantic & Pacific a

-----

f-'

feeder line to the "Frisco" that extended to the Colorado River.

Hailed

by the Railway Review "as the most important move that has been made in
the Southwestern system of railroads for a long time," the

Gould~Huntington

agreement also allowed for joint usage of the Southern Pacific's track
20
from El Paso to Texas & Pacific connection.
Peace was temporarily
established in the Southwest.
However, the peace did not last long.

Huntington, whose plans

included an eastern outlet for his Southern Pacific, was determined to
reach the Mississippi Valley or some other point east of the river.

He

persuaded T. H. Pierce, a business ally in control of the Galveston,
Harrisburg and San Antonio, to match the westward expansion of Gould's
International Great Northern mile for mile, with a parallel line.
this new pressure, Gould changed strategy.

Under
L

After twenty-five miles of

---

track had been laid, he ordered the International to shift its line south
from El Paso to Laredo, hoping thereby to open the Repub 1i c of ~'!exi co to
his Southwestern System. 21 Thus Gould bowed to the continuous pressure
of Huntington's eastward expansion.
Pacificwest1~ard,

Instead of extending the Texas and

he went south and hoped to offset his traffic loss

~lith

-----

a

20 commercial and Financial Chronicle, January 28, 1882, pp. 99-101;
Railway Rev1ew, January 28, 1882, p. 51; February 8, 1882, p. 67.
21
Julius Grodinsky, Transcontinental Railway Strategy, (Ph<iladelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), p. l69,
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connection to

~!exico.

Capitalizing on the changing economic conditions,

""--------- - - - ~-

Gould lessened his chances for financial losses in 1881.

~Jith

the Inter-

national Great Northern building toward the Rio Grande, Gould ended the
Missouri, Kansas and Texas' efforts to connect Dennison, Texas, with
Taylor, Texas, on the Rio Grande thus eliminating duplication of rail
lines. Acting in the interests of the Southwestern System, he sought
approval for this curtailment at a special stockholders meeting.

The

Missouri, Kansas &Texas stockholders, without opposition, approved Gould's
actions. 22 The stock market rise in the sun~er of 1881 afforded Gould
the opportunity to sell his holdings in the Texas & Pacific and the Vlabash
and obtain large profits.

The timing was excellent, for by the latter

part of 1881 the economic activity of the country began to decline as a
result of railroad over-expansion.

Rail earnings per mile dipped in

comparison to the previous year and the increased railroad mileage ~1as not
justified by the growth in population. 23 Consolidation of the SouthVJestern
System and the elimination of his personal security holdings in the system,
therefore, became more imperative as 1881 drew to a close.
II I.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOUTHVIESTERN SYSTEM

Gould decided to reduce his stock and bond holdings in the Southwestern System through his merger efforts.

In doing so, Gould obtained

22Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 347.
23 see Appendix, Table XVII for rail earnings comparison.
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profits, eliminated possible losses, and again demonstrated his brilliance

~::'-=---"---- - - - - -- - - --

c~---~

in corporate finance.
It was apparent early in 1881 that the cornerstone of the consolidated system ~10uld be the Missouri Pacific. 24 Articles of agreement were
filed with the State of Missouri to consolidate the following companies
with the Missouri Pacific:

the St. Louis &Lexington; the Kansas City &

Eastern; the Lexington &Southern; the St. Louis, Kansas &Arizona; and
the Kansas City &Leavenworth. The outcome of the merger vote was never
.
25
in doubt since Jay Gould controlled all of the roads.
The name of the
company, the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, had a total capitalization
of $30,000,000 and a system comprising 587 miles.26
Speculative activity on the stock market increased throughout the
fall of 1880 and the spring of 1881, coinciding with the rise in business
activity.

Taking advantage of the rapid increase in the value of Iron

Mountain stock, Gould, who owned slightly less than fifty per cent of the
shares, proposed a merger between the Iron

~1ountain

and Texas & Pacific.

Considerable controversy took place among the shareholders of the two
companies, especially over terms which provided for a share-for-share
exchange plus five per cent to Texas &Pacific stockholders. 27

-------

24 Railway Review, April 30, 1881, p. 238.
25see Appendix Tables XVIII-XIX.
26 commercial and Financial Chronicle, July 30, 1880, p. 123;
Railway Review, August21, 1880, p. 427.
27
Railway Revie~1, April 30, 1881 ,p. 242.
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After apparently being accepted, the Texas &Pacific stockholders rejected

-=-_-f" ____

_

the terms since the Iron Mountain did not have a land grant or other
resources to compensate for the Texas &Pacific land grant.
Frustrated in his first attempt, Gould 'Offered to merge the Iron
Mountain into the Missouri Pacific. He proposed an exchange of three
Missouri Pacific shares for four Iron Mountain shares.

Hith Gould as a

major stockholder in the Iron Mountain and the controlling stockholder in

II

the Missouri, acceptance of the terms was assured and the Iron

~lountain

combined with the Missouri Pacific.28
Turning to the Missouri, Kansas

&

Texas, Gould issued an official

notice in April, 1881, calling for a special stockholders meeting.
According to the prearranged agenda, the participants were:
1. To consider and act upon a proposed 1ease of the railway
company and the property of the ~li ssouri , Kansas g, Texas to the
Missouri Pacific Railway Company.

2. To consider and act upon a proposed lease of contract with
the International Great Northern Railroad Company for the joint
use of and occupancy by the Nissouri, Kansas &Texas of that portion
of said International Great Northern Railroad Company's line
commencing at the point of interchange of the two roads in
Williamson or Miami County, Texas, and extending via Questin
through to the Rio Grande.
3. To consider and act upon a proposed lease or contract
with the Texas &Pacific for the joint use and occupancy of that
portion of the Texas &Pacific Railroad Company's line extending
from Whitesboro to Fort' Worth.
4. To consider and act upon a proposed contract to be submitted
to said meeting, for the management and operation of the company's
27Railway Revie1~, April 30, 1881 , p. 242.
28 Railway Review, April 30, 1881 ' p. 241 ;
21, 1881, p. 424.

~

Raih~ay

-

Gazette, August
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railway, upon such terms as wi 11 secure to it the entire net
earnings from its several pr2~erties, less current expenses for
maintenance and betterments.
When the meeting got under way, a 1ease with the Missouri Pacific
for ninety-nine years was signed; however, the Missouri Pacific assumed only
the responsibility for the operation of the road.

i'lo mention was made of

the funded debt.
lvith the Missouri, Kansas & Texas leased to the · t~issouri Pacific,

Gould sought to forestall any possible rivalry between the International
Great Northern and Missouri, l<ansas & Texas by a merger.

He suggested an

exchange of one share of International stock for two shares of
K~.nsas

& Texas stock.

r~issouri,

The exchange rate was based on ·the market value of

the two stocks prior to the merger. 30 Gould easily manipulated the
exchange rate since he owned two thirds of the International's outstanding
stock.
Hith the western portion of the
Gould turned to the east and the

Ne~1

South~1estern

System consolidated,

Orleans Pacific.

Absorption of the

New Orleans Pacific by the Texas & Pacific was contemplated ever since
Gould began construction on the New Orleans line.

Upon completion of the

1ine, a merger was consummated with a share-for-share exchange with the

Texas &Pacific as then surviving company. 31
29Railway Review, April 23, 1881, p. 227.
30 commercial and Financial Chronicle, May 14, 1881, p. 526.
31 commercial and Financial Chronicle, June 4, 1881, p. 613.
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Between 1879 and 1881, Gould became motivated by a primary desire

§_:____-;:_:
m---0-'- -_-~-------

to create a railroad monopoly in the Southwestern United States.

He let

no idea of business morality or personnel charity deflect him from this
purpose.32 By the end of 1881, the monopoly was an accomplished fact,
with a system in excess of 5,000 miles and a minimum personal investment.

32Robert Edgar Riegel, The }tory of the \4estern Railroads, (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1926 , p. ITs-.-Hereafter c1ted as Riegel,
!,I estern Rai 1roads. For additional information concerning rai 1 consu111pti on
and the Gould interlocking directorates, see Appendix Tables XX-XXII.
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CHAPTER V
A STOCK PRICE ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTHWESTERN SYSTEM,
1879-1881

An analysis of the Southwestern railroads stock price movement
during the period of 1879-1881 reveals interesting data.

During the

time that Gould was building his Southwestern System, the stock prices
of his rail lines were in an upward price trend.

As Gould merged or

leased each line, speculators pushed the stock prices to all-time highs.
After Gould had secured his profits through mergers, stock prices fell
rapidly.

However, Gould still controlled the lines through his majority

interest in the Missouri Pacific.
I.

THE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD

Quoted prices for the Missouri Pacific shares prior to 1879 are not
available in the financial papers of New York City. However, in September,
1879, the Corrmercial and Financial Chronicle quoted the high and low price

for the month as twelve dollars and two dollars respectively.

Before

Gould's efforts to acquire the Missouri Pacific from C. K. Garrison, the
stock reached a high of approximately

t1~enty

dollars a share.

It is not

surprising then, in 1887 that the Pacific Railway Commission Examiner went
into considerable detail to explain why Jay Gould paid $950 per share for
the Missouri Pacific 11hich he purchased from Garrison.

Control of the

Missouri Pacific enabled Gould to eventually consummate his Kansas Pacific"':'--------_
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Union Pacific merger.
the Missouri Pacific.

The resulting profits justified his expenditure for
In January, 1881, the price of Missouri Pacific

stock reached a high of ninety dollars per share.

During a period of

thirteen months in which the stock had no listed quotations in the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, the price increased a minimum of
350 per cent, notwithstanding the Gould reorganization and the resultant
increase in the number of shares outstanding. Prior to the eventual
consolidation of 1881, the stock reached a high of $114.
According to generally accepted theories of technical analysis
prevalent today, the Missouri Pacific stock established non-parallel upward
trend lines. These trend lines are represented by lines AB and AC as
illustrated in Graph I. The significance of the trend lines reveals that
the upward price trend was never violated until after the consolidation
was completed.

Thereafter, the significance of the violation lies in the

assumption that the public demand for the Missouri Pacific stock
lessening.

~1as

The poor economic reports toward the latter part of 1881 and

the loss of speculative interest after Gould's consolidation probably
accounted for the drop in price.
II.

THE TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILROAD

Prior to 1880, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle listed no
quotations for the Texas &Pacific.

This is quite understandable since

the Texas & Pacific stock was closely held by management and was in a
difficult period. The first quote for the Texas &Pacific stock appeared
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in February, 1880, at $47 per share.

For the rest of 1880, the price

fluctuated bet\•teen a high of $40 and a low of $34.

By the latter part

of 1880, the Gould interest in the Texas & Pacific was apparent, as prices
reached $74 just prior to the consolidation of the
Texas & Pacific in 1881.

~1issouri

Pacific and the

The Texas & Pacific appreciated approximately

one hundred per cent over a period of nine months.

Analysis of the Texas

& Pacific chart pattern, as illustrated in Graph II, reveals an upward

price channe 1 that was not broken unti 1 after the Missouri Pacific
consolidation 18 1881.
II I.

THE

l~ISSOURI,

KANSAS AND TEXAS RAILROAD

Analysis of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas presents a much clearer
association between stock price movements and ,Jay Gould's activities.
Breaking of the first trend line (shown as AB on Graph III) in late 1879
indicates a definite upward swing in the price of the stock.

Trend line

&

CD presents additional proof of the strong demand for Missouri, Kansas
Texas stock which coincided with Gould's attempt to take control of the
line.

Throughout 1880, the price of the stock remained

CD and EF, an indication of strong demand for the stock.

\~ithin

the channel

Volume statistics,

shown at the bottom of Graph III, confirms the demand for the stock.

The

corresponding increases and decreases in volume paralleled the rise and
fall of the stock.

Of significance is the fact that during each period

that Gould was manipulating the market, the volume increased very sharply
but dropped off when Gould had accomplished his goals.

Breaking of the
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upward trend 1i ne CD occurred after the Missouri Pacific consolidation
[3---

~

in 1881.
IV.

THE ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN AN!J SOUTHERN RAILROAD

!•lith Gould's purchase of the Missouri Pacific in November, 1879, the
price of the Iron

~1ountain

stock began to fluctuate

~1idely

between an

approximate high of $66 and a low of $35 as presented in Graph IV.

More

than likely the wide changes in price were a result of rumors or reports
concerning the Iron

relationship to the Missouri Pacific.

~·1ountain's

Gould

began to purchase 1arge amounts of I ron Mountain stock during the 1atter
part of 1880, although he probably obtained smaller quantities of stock
prior to that time.
The upward trend (seen as line Al3) was never broken despite the
fluctuating price pattern of the Iron

r~ountain

stock.

Volume statistics

correspond very closely to the upward movement of the stock.

The high

prices of February, 1880, and March, 1881, were accompanied by the highest
volume of the period. The upward thrust coincided with the Iron MountainMissouri Pacific merger indicating the speculative interest.

Also since

Gould owned a considerable amount of Iron Mountain stock, it can be safely
assumed that he contributed greatly to this speculative activity.
V.

THE INTERNATIONAL GREAT NORTHEPJII RAILROAD

Pricewise, little if any information was reported concerning the
International prior to 1880.

Nevertheless, Gould's influence in the

International was very evident.

The rapid price movements as shown in
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Graph V were undoubtedly a speculator's delight.

From a low of $37.60 in

October, 1880, the price moved upward to a high of $92 within seven months.
By the time the International merged with the Missouri, Kansas &Texas
in June, 1881, Gould possessed sixty-seven per cent of the International's
stock and undoubtedly contributed greatly to its speculative activity.
VI.

CON CL US I ON

The preceeding graphs show a close relationship between Gould's
market manipulations and the value of Gould's Southwestern rail stocks.
An even more significant insight is given when the monthly highs of the
Gould stocks are compared to the important events of the period. They
are shown on Graph VI illustrating how Gould manipulated the stock prices
to further his consolidation efforts in the Southwestern System. Hi thout
a doubt, Gould utilized the stock market to achieve his pecuniary objectives.
- -
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CHAPTER VI
THE DELINE OF THE SOUTHWESTERN SYSTEM, 1882-1892
Built in sparsely settled areas, the Southwestern System began to
disintegrate as the excessive expansion and poor management policies of
1881 exacted their toll.

Continued financial problems after 1882 left Jay

Gould with only a semblance of control in the Southwest by 1892.
In 1882, the promise of considerable wheat traffic from California
and the continued westward movement of immigrants caused the Texas &
Pacific managers to express optimism over the company's future earnings.
The railroad's management built special railroad cars to accommodate the
immigrant traffic.

"Where, a year ago, were no, or very few inhabitants,

-there are now thriving towns and settlements," reported the Railway
Review. 1 However, the optimism soon turned sour. The rail traffic failed
to materialize, and in July, 1882, the company announced that no interest
would be paid on the Land Grant Bonds.

Neither did the management issue

script for the unpaid interest as they had done in previous years.2
In the same year, expansion of the competing narrow gauge Texas &
St. Louis Railroad gave Jay Gould further concern. Had the Line been
completed southward to Haco, Texas, and northward to Chicago as proposed,
it v1ould have cut very deeply into the Southwestern monopoly. 3 Threats and
1November 12, 1882, p. 65.
2Railway Review, July 8, 1882, p. 392.
3Railway Review, January 8, 1881, p. 20.
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counter-threats between Gould and the Texas &St. Louis had begun as
early as 1880. Gould this time, however, attempted to capture the
essential rail line in the proposed Texas &St. Louis expansion route by
acquiring the Gulf, Colorado,

&

Santa Fe.

Unable to acquire the Gulf

at low prices, Gould resorted to rate wars and refused to accept the
through tickets sold by the line.

However, the determined Gulf manage-

ment fought Gould successfully until 1886 when the Gulf merged with the
Atchison, Topeka &Santa Fe. Thus Gould lost his battle to acquire the
Gulf.
Other rate wars were soon in the offing. The Galveston, Harrisburg,
&

San Antonio, the Texas & New Orleans, and the Louisville & Western

railroads--all either controlled by or friendly to Gould's enemy, Collis
P. Huntington--announced that they would refuse to accept through bills of
lading issued by the Gould lines. 4 t\t the same time the Galveston pressed
for completion of its new 1ine from Houston to El Paso, which waul d connect
the Southern Pacific and by-pass the Texas &Pacific route to New Orleans.5
Thus, when the line was completed in 1883, Gould failed in his effort to
prevent Huntington from achieving his eastern outlet to the Mississippi
Valley. Huntington's new Texas route dealt a blow to the Texas & Pacific,
as little traffic originated along the Texas &Pacific tracks in the
thinly settled area between Fort Worth and El Paso. The Gould system
thus lost the interchange traffic coming from the west on the Southern

$Railway Review, November 4, 1882, p. 624.
5rbid., September 16, 1882, p. 531.
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Pacific.

!: -_

Gould also failed in his attempt to control the
Rock, a long-standing competitor of the Iron Mountain.

~1emphis

& Little

His legal suit

was so outrageous that the presiding judge would not even consider asking
the Memphis bondholders to enter into an inquiry which would eliminate
their bond rights.

Even though Gould used every 1egal and fi nanci a1

technique possible, he was unable to gain control of the road.

To

recompense for the failure, he v1as forced to build a duplicating line to
~1emphi s. 6
In addition to these troubles, Gould went on the defensive as Hall
Street suffered a panic in February, 1882.7 Contributing to the scare were
rumors that Gould was over-extended in the "Bear Market."

To offset

such rumors and in a manner without precedent, Gould exhibited $53,000,000
of par value stock to reporters.
in excess of $40,000,000.

t~arket

value of the stock was said to be

Actually what Gould revealed to astute observers

was not l1is assets but the fact that he was short of cash and was therefore
unable to support his holdings against any excessive public selling which
would depress the stock prices. 8 Coupled with the panic on Hall Street
came a decline in commodity prices.

Record grain crops, together with a

drop in the European market demand in 1882, sent farm prices sliding downward.

Shock waves from the squeeze on commodity speculators spilled over
7New York Times, February 28, 1881, p. 8.
'
8 Railway Gazette, March 17, 1882, p. 169.
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into the stock market, and Gould stocks declined with the rest of the
,,_---t;;;-- --

market.
Troubles continued to plague Gould after 1882.

Early in 1883,

Gould's hold on the Habash was jeopardized by rumors which circulated to
the effect that the road needed money.

Ne1~spapers

reported that 1arge

amounts of Habash commercial paper, bearing the signatures of Gould,
Russell Sage, and Sidney Dillon, \~ere outstanding and unpaid. 9 The
effect of the rumors eventually forced the Habash into receivership, but
Gould retained control by appointing himself as receiver by using the
commercial paper debt.
In the Southwest, Gould was also in trouble.
closure and managerial loss of the Texas

To prevent fore-

&Pacific, Gould used Missouri

Pacific funds to pay $1,250,000 in unpaid bond interest to Texas
bondholders. 10

Thus, Gould kept control of the Texas

&Pacific

&Pacific.

In the midst of all these financial problems, Gould also lost his
influence in the Union Pacific by not heeding certain legal requirements
in the Thurman Act of 1878.

The act required setting aside 25 per cent

of the Union Pacific's income for repayment funds advanced by the federa 1
government.

Gould failed to set aside these funds and he was forced to

relinquish control by Congress in 1884.
Gould's fortune

~1aned

even further in 1884.

Trying to recoup his

9 Railway Gazette, December 1, 1882.
1°Richard O'Connor, Gould ~1illions, (New York: Doubleday & Company,
1962), p. 230. Hereafter cited as O'Connor, Gou1d.
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position, he misjudged the downward stock market trend and brought himself
s----

closer to the brink of financial collapse.

Unknown to Gould, James Keene,

Henry N. Smith, Charles Hoerishoffer, and several other leading Wall
Street speculators, all united to "break" the leading financier by
depressing the value of Gould's stocks. Stock prices dropped to "bankruptcy levels" even though Gould tried to support the sagging market.
However, he could not overcome the trend. Seemingly beaten, he sent his
emissary to the speculators led by Keene.ll Much to their astonishment,
Keene and his followers were presented, not with a plea for terms, but
with an ultimatum. Shown a document that assigned all of Jay Gould's
wealth to his heirs, the Keene group were informed that he would soon
publish his notice of default.
profit would be eliminated.

If Gould declared bankruptcy, all hopes of

Thus Keene and his fellow speculators decided

to sign an agreement that became Gould's financial salvation.

The specu-

lators agreed to purchase from Gould 40,000 shares of Western Union stock
for $2,500,000, thereby giving Gould enough cash to satisfy his creditors.
However, as far as Keene and his friends were concerned. Gould was
finishect. 12

11~1athew Josephson, The Robber Barrens, (New York: Harcourt, Brace
& Company), p. 234.
-

12o•connor, Gould, p. 234.
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Gould, obviously, had other ideas. He lcnew through his informants
that Keene and his followers had sold 11 Short 1113 1>1issouri Pacific stock.
With a large percentage of Missouri Pacific already under his control,
Gould proceeded to use the newly acquired $2,500,000 to buy more Missouri
Pacific stock.

Up went the price even higher.

Unable to cover their

positions and now completely routed, they bought enough stock from Gould
in the 90's to return the stock they had borrowed to sell short. 14·
Gould reduced other debts in the summer market rally of 1884.
However, he also announced his retirement from active participation in
stock market speculation at that time.

Even though Hall Street operators

were skeptical about the statement, the strain of the previous months
had been too severe on Gaul d and he never fully recovered from the near
disasters. l.S
Labor troubles struck the Southwestern System in 1885. Wage cuts
and dismissals occurred as a business depression cycle set in.

The Knights

of Labor went on strike against the Gould lines and vowed to stay off the
job until previous wage cuts were restored.

Labor unrest grew into violence

in 1886 and halted all transportation operations.

In an era of public

hostility to labor unions, Gould was able to break the strike by bringing
13 Keene and his friends borrowed stock and soldthis stock hoping
that the large amount of stock put up for sale would depress the price as
a result of excess supply. Then when prices were low, they would repurchase
sufficient stock to replace the stock they had borrowed. This technique
is referred to as 11 se 11 i ng short. 11
14o•connor, Gould, p. 234.
15rbid.

~----------
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non-union "scabs" to replace the strikers.

Formation of labor unions on

~~-

---_

,---- =

--

t;;--

the Gould lines was limited for many years thereafter.

----

However, the labor

troubles were costly to the railroads as business activity dropped
sharply during the period of turmoil.
Throughout the years after 1881, Gould diverted traffic and manipulated freight rates to the advantage of the Missouri Pacific, the only
railroad in which he had significant security holdings.

Money that should

have gone into property improvements had been diverted to the
Pacific or used to finance rate wars in the Southwest.
lations finally forced the

~1issouri,

~1issouri

Continued manipu-

Kansas & Texas and the Texas & Pacific

into receivership in 1888 and 1885 respectively, thereby forcing Gould
to expend his energies in trying to gain control of these lines again.
From 1888 to 1892, Gould made several attempts to re-establish his
hold over the Texas & Pacific and the r,lissouri, Kansas

~.Texas.

In 1889,

he emerged as the major stockholder in the Texas &Pacific, but he failed
~---

in his efforts to resecure the Missouri, Kansas & Texas which now became
a competitor to the Gould lines.

The cornerstone of the old Southwestern

System, the Missouri Pacific, expanded westward under Gould's direction.
However, before Gould could res tore the rai 1road system to its former
size, he became seriously ill in November, 1892.
Outside the Gould mansion a "death
1892.

~latch"

started on December 1,

Reporters from all the leading New York newspapers gathered and

sent messengers to their respective offices whenever news was made
available. The next day at 9:15 a.m., Jay Gould died. 16 Hithin a fe\~
16o•connor, Gould. p. 284.
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months after his death, the Southwestern System began to disappear.
was never reconstructed by his successors.

It

,--

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
"It is one of the incidents of Jay Gould's scheming plans to obtain
control of a vast network of trans-Mississippi roads," wrote a New York
Times reporter in 1881. 1 Gould acquired railroads at such a rapid rate
that the same paper in 1881 exclaimed:

"Gould is on the point of destroying

the country. u2 As he began his drive to become the United States' 1eadi ng
railroad baron, Gould received great public condemnation, but he anticipated it.

Regardless of public opinion, Gould was a successful businessman.

The key to his success was his knowledge of corporate finance, and he
understood the "maze" better than anyone else.
After failing in his first attempt to merge the Union Pacific and
Kansas Pacific, Gould sought control of the Missouri Pacific.

Aware of

the Missouri Pacific's strategic location, Gould paid far more for the
line than the line's inherent physical value.

Control of the Missouri

Pacific enabled Gould eventually to consummate the Union Pacific-Kansas
Pacific merger.

However, it is worth noting that Gould did not include

the Missouri Pacific in the Union Pacific-Kansas Pacific merger.

\~ith

limited stock capitalization and a strategic location, the Missouri
Pacific offered Gould other financial opportunities.

l"Railroad Interests and the Public Interests," New York Times,
--January 20, 1880, p. 4.

2Nel~ York Times, February 23, 1881, p. 4.

a
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Railroad expansion ceased with the depression of 1873. The Southwestern railroads extended from town to town and then stopped because of
a lack of funds to complete their building programs.

Railroad securities

sold at discounts ranging up to ninety per cent of par value.

Defining

a corporation as a body of men brought together for a common purpose,
Gould led the speculators who proceeded to buy, build, and connect the
3
fragmented Southwestern rai 1roads. Those roads that could not be purchased

I

outright were incorporated through the use of rate wars, law suits, duplication of rail lines, repudiation of debt, and other maneuvers.
After the Southwestern System took form, Gould began to move his
personal capital out of these railroad securities in order to finance his
other business ventures.

He used the stock market whenever possible to

secure the optimum profit and release from a particular venture, but at
the same time, continued to maintain managerial control of the Southwestern
System largely through his strong forceful personality.
Gould was strongly tempted by the prospect of securing monopolistic
-----

control in the Southwest.

However, he was a speculative capitalist rather

than a corporate manager; long range management duties, coupled 11ith
limited profits, probably did not appeal to him. Neither was Gould
considered to be a bui 1der; primarily he was pictured as a wrecker and a
buyer during panics. 4 He did, however, bring a railroad system to the
Southwest that still exists today.

Whether the cost was excessive compared

3Railroad Review, March 5, 1881, p. 127.

4oenver Tribune, November 30, 1880, p. 1.
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to the results obtained cannot be ascertained.

~~~'----

The Gould Southwestern System was the result of one man's work.
was built and controlled by Gould's forceful personality.

It

For several

years in the 1880's he had only limited investments in the Southwestern
railroads except for the Missouri Pacific, although he continued to direct
the road's destinies.

vJhen he died in 1892, the concept of the South-

western System died with him.

I

Only with a strong and forceful business

personality could the re-recreation of the Southwestern System be attempted.
The Gould heirs were lacking in all these essential traits.
It may be useful to draw a parallel between Gould's scheme and a
modern railroad financier's plan in the Southwest.

\1illiam G. Marbury,

astonishingly little-known in modern rail circles, has been attempting
in recent years to build a new Southwestern System that will encompass
25,000 miles of rail lines from Chicago south to St. Louis and New Orleans,
and west to San Francisco. 5 If completed, the result will be a corporate
pyramid of $3,100,000,000. 6
To many observers, Marbury's plan seems to be a dream.

However,

in January, 1967, the Missouri Pacific gained access to Chicago by
purchasing the Chicago, Eastern Illinois Railroad with court approval _7
~·1i ssouri

Pacific also hal ds approximately ten per cent of the Santa Fe's

5
"Bill Marbury Strives to Build A Mammoth \~estern Rail Pyramid,"
Wall Street Journal, October 11, 1968, pp. 1,18.
6see Appendix, Table XXVIII.
7"High Court Clears Way for MoPac to Buy C&EI, for Line into
Chicago," Wall Street Journal, January 10, 1967, p. 26.

~·\;::; __
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voting stock and, in addition, controls the Texas &Pacific Railroad.
As was Jay Gould,
obstinate, and ruthless.

~4arbury

is variously described as aloof,

t~~-

_ _ -:_

=- ----~-

Under his direction the Mississippi River

Corporation, parent organization of the Missouri Pacific, increased its
profits from $12.6 million in 1961 to $26.3 million in 1966. 8 But unlike
Gould, Marbury is a proven manager.
managerial interests.

Control and development are his main

Acceptable to both the business community and to

the private investor, Marbury may succeed in building his "mammoth"
western rail system.

He appears to be strong in areas where Jay Gould

was weak-•i n management and development of corporate properties. Thus,
a new Southwestern System may again be reconstructed.

Hopefully the new

system will serve the public instead of speculative personal interests.

---

8Wall Street Journal, January 10, 1967, p. 26.
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TABLE I
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ORGANIZATION PLAN OF THE KANSAS CITY POOL1

Kansas Pacific
Securities
Stock

Par Value

Exchange Rate

$9,600,000

12.5%

Value in
New Stock
$1,200,000

1,200,000

par

1 ,200,000

227,000

50%

113 ,500

Subordinated
In come Bonds

4,048,350

30%

1,214,350

Second Land
Grant Bonds

1,055,000

50%

527,500

Arkansas Valley
Railway Bonds

570,000

50%

285,000

Leavenworth Branch
Bonds

630,000

50%

315,000

Floating Debt
Unsubordi nated
Income Bonds

$17,330,350

$4,855,350
-------

1Pacific Railway Report: 1887, p. 456.

,.__~-~~'L ___ "
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TABLE II
GOULD SECURITY HOLDINGS IN THE KANSAS CITY POOL AGREEMENT 1

Kansas Pacific
Securities
Stock
Unsubordi nated
Income Bonds
Subordinated
Income Bonds
Second Land
Grant Bonds

Amount

Par Value

Estimated
Cost

42,000 shares

$ 420,000

95 bonds 2

47,500

23,750 3

2,143.7 bonds 4

2,143,700

643, no 5

160 ,000

80,0006

160 bonds

$ 52,500

c

1Pacific Railway Report: 1887, pp. 456-77.
2$500 par value bonds.
3Estimated at 50 per cent according to testimony before the United
States Pacific Railway Commission: 1887.
4The decimal represents $700 par value. The figure 2,143 represents
$1,000 par value bonds.
5Estimated at 30 per cent according to testimony before the United
States Pacific Railway Commission: 1887.
6Author's estimate. The figure is based on probable prices during
the purchase of the other Kansas Pacific securities.

~----~---~-

-

~
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TABLE III
TI-lE WABASH-ST.LOUIS, KANSAS CITY & NORTHERN CONSOLIDATIONl

Route

Miles

Toledo to East St. Louis
Chicago and Paducah '"'
Chicago and Strawn •••
Eeel River . . . • . . . . •
Decatur to Quincy &Hannibal
Other branches • . • . • . .
Total Wabash Mileage
St. Louis & Kansas City • •
t1oberly to Ottumwa • • • • .
Brunswick to Pattsburg ••.
Pattsburg to Council Bluffs •.
Lexington Junction to St. Joseph
Quincy Missouri & Pacific
Other branches • . • . . . . • .
Total St. Louis, Kansas City &
Northern &Mileage
Consolidated Length

433

157
95
94
201
68

1,048

275
131

81

146
76

102
37
-848
1 ,896

mi 1es

1commercial and Financial Chronicle, November 15, 1879, p. 513.
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TABLE IV
1879 GOULD PURCHASE OF MISSOURI PACIFIC HITH RELATED ROADS 1

Railroad Company
Missouri Pacific

Securities
4 ,000 shares

Price

Total Cost

$950 per

$3,800,000

share
Kansas Central

385 bonds

80% plus

310,992.47

interest
Kansas Central

2 ,251 shares

1Pacific Railway Report: 1887.

$18 per sl1are

Approximate

45,000.00

•- - _,o -- -- ---
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TABLE V
E: ------- --

KANSAS PACIFIC RAILWAY C0~1PANY1
Ne1~ York, January 14, 1880
Memorandum of terms of agreement for consolidation of Union Pacific
with Kansas Pacific, in which the Denver Pacific, St. Joseph and Western
and Union Pacific, Eastern Division, are included.
All necessary papers and any further agreements to be prepared by
Judge Dillon on his return. The Union Pacific, with all their respective
liabilities, are to be put together at par of their respective capitals $36,762,300 and $10,000,000 - to which is to be added the capital of the
Denver Pacific, $4,000,000, making the capital of the Union P2cific
Railway Company, as the new line shall be called $51,762,300.
The Denver Pacific capital, now an asset of the Kansas Pacific,
is to be used, after conversion into Union Pacific Railway stock, to
pay for shares and bonds of St. Joseph and Western Railroad and St. Joseph
Bridge, as hereafter states, and for other purposes.
The St. Joseph and Western first-mortgage bonds and stocks, to the
extent of the controlling interest in the same, to be bought of parties
now owning it, at par for bonds, and $20 a share for stock, payment to be
made in Union Pacific Railway stock at par.
The road to be leased to the Union Pacific Railway Company for the
interest on first mortgage bonds, or otherl'lise as may be determined.
The bridge at St. Joseph is to be bought of parties now owning controlling
interest in the bonds and shares of same, at par for bonds with the shares
thrown in, and payment to be made either in shares of Union Pacific Railway
at par, or Kansas Pacific consolidated-mortgage bonds at par.
The Union Pacific, eastern division, is to be taken at cost to
Mr. Gould, and paid for in same securities that he gave, viz, about onehalf in Kansas Pacific consolidated-mortgage bonds and one-half in new
Union Pacific 6 per cent trust bonds, both at par.
R.S.
,Jay Gould
Fred' k L. Ames
E. H. Baker
F. G. Dexter
Sidney Di 11 on
E. Atkins

if>acific Raih1ay Report: 1887, p. 61.
2An apparent error, this should read $50,762,300.

-

----

-
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TABLE VI

ti__ :- ' -

SECURITIES DELIVERED TO JAY GOULDl
February 16, 1880, delivered to Jay Gould in payment for
the following securities:
St. Joseph and Pacific first-mortgage bonds
and scrip at par . • • • . • . . • • . • •
Kansas and Nebraska Railway Company's first
mortgage bonds and scrip • • . • • • . • •
Kansas and Nebraska Railway Company's second
mortgage bonds and scrip • • • • . • • • .
Kansas Centra1 Ra i1 road bonds • . • . . . •
Kansas Central Railroad stock, 2,421 shares
St. Joseph and Denver City receiver's
certificates • • . • • • • . . • . • • . .
St. Joseph Bridge Building Company bonds ••
St. Joseph Bridge Building Company stock,
4,000 shares
•.•••••...•..
St. Joseph and Hestern stock, 15,162 shares
at 20 • • . • . • . • • . . •
Hastings and Grand Island Bonds
Hall County bonds
.•.••
Total (34,641 shares)2

1Paci fi c Railway Report: 1887, p. 381.
2$100 par value Union Pacific stock.

$1,020,204.23
729,820.00
24,700.00
479,000,00
59,000.00
784,000.00

307,240.00
60,204.25
$3,464,168.48

P:----~
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TABLE VII
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STATISTICS--UNION PACIFIC &KANSAS PACIFIC MERGER 1

Union Pacific
Miles of Road

$

1 ,039

$

780
4,904,857

Net Earnings for Year

6,506,562

1,690,993

Other Income

2,282,418

60,617

Debt Due United States

45,657,599

10,919,683

Other Bonded Debt

50,404,000

22 '130 '100

869,891

5,621 ,366

4,561,845

1,219,080

Capita 1 Stock

36,762,300

9 ,689 ,950

Assets besides Road &Equipment

27,123,902

10,427,283

Interest Accrued and Due
Bills and Accounts Payable

.

Kansas Pacific

12,904,857

Gross Earnings for Year

--

r-~---·

Annual Interest other than
United States

4,234,133

1,665,060

Earnings Applicable to Dividends
and Sinking Fund

4,214,816

85,617

-----

----

---- ------

l~ailway Review, January 24, 1-80, p. 39.
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TABLE VIII
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FUNDED DEBT OF THE TEXAS

&

PACIFIC - JI'.AY 31, 18801

Type of Bond

E_

Amount

1st Mortgage Bonds-Eastern Division
Consolidated Mortgage Bonds-East Division
Income and Land Grant Bonds
Old Land Grant Bonds, Scrip, & Misc.
Interest Scrip-Redeemable in land or stock
Texas School Fund Loan
Total Funded Debt

$

3,481,000
7,619,000
8,177,000
321 ,343
1,552,570
181 ,677

$21 ,332,590

TABLE IX
RAIL LINES OWNED BY THE TEXAS &PACIFIC- MAY 31, 18802

Miles

Area
Shreveport, La., to Ft. v,lorth, Texas
Texarkana to Sherman, Texas
Texarkana Junction to Marshall
Total Miles

219.69
155. 12
69.05
443.86

1Railway Gazette, August 13, 1880, p. 436.
2 rbid.

i~

---------------
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TABLE X
RAILROAD EQUIPMENT OF THE MISSOURI, KANSAS, AND TEXAS 1879 1
Quantity
88
34
20
5
798
360
315
96

48
1
1
20
4
1
1

1
1

Type of Rolling Stock
Engines
Passenger Cars
Baggage Cars
Postal Cars
Box Cars
Stock Cars
Coal Cars
Flat Cars
Caboose Cars
Pay Car
Business Cars
Dump Cars
Boarding Cars
Magazine Car
Derrick Car
Tool Car
Pi 1e Driver Car

---

..

c:-------

[Railway Gazette, November 12, 1880, p. 599.

L__

79
TABLE XI

~~·~~···~.

~

-

FUNDED DEBT OF THE t~ISSOURI, KANSAS, AND TEXAS 18791
~of

Bond

Amount

Union Pacific, Southern Branch Bonds
$ 2,315,000
Tebo &Neosho Bonds
349,000
Hannibal & Central Missouri 1st t~ortgage
Bonds
768,000
Hannibal &Central Missouri 2nd Mortgage
Bonds
32,000
M. K. T. Consolidated Bonds
14,752,000
M. K. T. Income Bonds &Scrip
7,571 ,533
$25,787,533

TABLE XII
RAIL LINES Oi!NED BY THE mSSOURI, KANSAS, & TEXAS 18792
Area

Miles

Hanni ba1 to Dennison, Texas
Ho1 den, r~o., to Pao1 a, Kansas
Parsons, Kansas to ,Junction City, Kansas
Total Miles

575.5
54.0
156.5

~

...,. ____

-~-

786.0

~

o-

1

Rai1way Gazette, November 12, 1880, p. 599.

2Ibid.

L
-=-,_-__
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TABLE XIII
RAILROAD EQUIPMENT OF THE ST. LOUfS,
I RON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN 1879

"""---=---=-----

Quantity
121

Engines
Passenger Cars
Sleeper Car
Baggage, Mail, &Express Car
Pullman Cars (50% interest)
Box Cars
Stock Cars
Flat Cars
Caboose Cars
Director's Car
Boarding Car
Derrick Car
Wrecking Cars
Pile-Driving Car

46
1
24
7
l, 138
424
1 ,029

48
1
1
1
3

1

--

1

Railway Gazette,

~1arch

26, 1880, p. 177.

-------

81
TABLE XIV
~-,-__ ,__

FUNDED DEBT OF THE ST. LOUIS, IRON t·10UNTAIN & SOUTHERN 1879 l

Type of Bond

!\mount

Various Divisional Bonds
First Preferred Income Bonds
Second Preferred Income Bonds

$21,925,000
4,054,937
4,088 '720
$30,068,657
,_
'

TABLE XV
RAIL LINES Ol.JNED BY THE ST. LOUIS, I RON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN 2

1879
Area

Miles

St. Louis to Texarkana, Texas
Bismark, ~·1issouri, to Belmont
Popular Bluff, Missour, to Bird's Point
Mineral Point, ~1issouri, to Potost
Total Mileage

1
Railwa,y Gazette,
2 rbid.

~1arch

26, 1880, p. 177.

490.0
120.0
71.0
3.5
684.5

c_
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TABLE XVI

!lL~-'--

ANNOUNCED EXPANSION OF THE GOULD SOUTH¥ESTERN RAILROAD
SYSTEM, JANUARY, 1881

Branch

Route

Distance

St. Louis & Southern
fl ranch

Parsons, Kansas to
Arkansas City

110 miles

Kansas, Arizona &
Pacific Branch

Leroy, Kansas, to
vii chi ta, Kansas

103 miles

Kansas, Arizona &
Pacific Branch

Ottawa, Kansas, to
Topeka, Kansas

42 miles

Lexington & Southern
Branch

Nevada, t~i ssouri to
Joplin, Missouri

65 miles

Jefferson City,
Lebanon &
Southwestern Branch

Jefferson City,
Missouri to Lamar,
t~i ssouri

125 miles

I GN Connection

t4hi tesboro, Texas, to
Fort Harth, Texas

70 miles

Jefferson City,
Lebanon &
Southwestern Branch

Greenville, Texas, to
Mineo 1a, Texas

50 miles

I GN Connection

Fort Worth, Texas, to
t~aco to Georgetown,
Texas

150 miles

San Antonio, Texas, to
Laredo, Texas, and
Georgetown, Texas, to
San Antonio, Texas

154 miles

Texas & PacificIGN Joint Usage

1Railway Review, Feeruary 12, 1881, p. 87.

-L::

-

-

e

135 mi 1es

----~~-·--·----

---

;·
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TABLE XVI I
;::-

AVERAGE EARNINGS PER MILE OF RAILROAD l
Per Cent of Increase over Previ~us Year
18801
1881

Month

January

16.7%

( 7.0% )

February

12.5%

(10.1%)

March

19.0%

( 6.1 %)

April

14.3%

2.9%

r1ay

10.4%

3.5%

June

16.7%

13.4%

July

9.7%

4.8%

12.7%

6.9%

3.6%

( 1 .6%)

August
September
October

( 0.2%)

5.1 %)

November

4.4%

( 1. 3%)

December

2.4%

6.2%

1commercial and Financial Chronicle, February 4, 1881.
2 Ibid. February 3, 1882.

-

>---- -------- ___ ..

84
~

·~--·".:::~

-

lo>_

TABLE XVI II
t>1ISSOURI PACIFIC CONSOLIDATION OF 18801

Debt
1st Mortgage Bonds
2nd Mortgage Bonds
3rd Mortgage Bonds
Real Estate
Carondelet Branch
Total

$ 7,000,000
2,573,000
4,500,000
800,000
250,000
$15,123,000

Branch Bonds
Missouri Pacific
$ 409,000
650,000
St. Louis & Lexington
Kansas City & Eastern
348,000
St. Louis, Kansas, &Arizona
1 ,200,000
Lexington &Southern
1 ,050,000
leavenworth, At chi son & Northwest
479,000
Total

$ 4,136,000
c=:----

1

Commercial and Financial Chronicle, p. 454.
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TABLE XIX

!Ec___::c_
~----

------

~'---

:::::

GOULD HOLDINGS IN THE MISSOURI PACIFIC CONSOLIDATION]

Company

Owner

Shares

5,028

t1issouri Pacific

Jay

Kansas City & Eastern

Jay Gould

3,660

St. Louis &Lexington

Jay Gould e,
P. M. Schmidt

4,845

&Southern

Gould

Jay Gould

10,500

St. Louis, Kansas City
&Atchison

Jay Gould

11,118

Kansas Ci ty &
Leavenworth

Jay Gould

16,801

Lexington

--

h--

The above shares represent more than 66 per cent of the total outstanding
stock voting in the Missouri Pacific Consolidation of 1880.

c
t:--

1commercial and Financial Chronicle, August 21, 1880, p. 223.

--
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TABLE XX
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RAIL CONSU~WTION 1872-1881 l

;

,___

Year

Total Tons

Construction

1872

1,530,850

740,500

790,350

1873

1,148,849

392,000

756,849

1874

837,695

192,000

645,695

1875

810,770

151,000

659,770

1876

879,916

231,000

648,916

1877

784,744

206,000

522,700

1879

1 '157 ,420

440,000

717,420

1880

1,674,235

688,000

986,235

1881

2,230,422

960,000

1 ,279 ,442

r~ai

---------

ntenance

I

I
•

I
~

'

1Railway Gazette, October 27, 1882, p. 662.

-------
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TABLE XXI

~---

RAIL CONSUMPTION 1872-1881 1

Aggregate Total Rail Tons

'

II

Per Cent of Track Renewal

1872

7,942,500

10.30%

--·-

1873

8,683,000

9.02%

----

1874

9,075,000

7.34%

1875

9,267,000

7.33%

1876

9,418,000

7.10%

1877

9,649,000

5.92%

1878

9,855,000

6. 56%

1879

10,215,000

7.24%

1880

10,384,000

9.52%

1881

11 ,385,000

11. 16%

I

----· --

··~-

I

lRailway Gazette, October 27, 1882, p. 662.
-----
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TABLE XXII
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UNION PACIFIC BOARD OF DIRECTORS-18801
Fredrick L. Ames

Russell Sage

Carlos S. Greeley

Jay Gould

Ezra H. Baker

So 1on Humphreys

Elisha Atkins

David Dows

F. Gordon Baxter

Thomas T. Eckert

Sidney Dillon

William L. Scott

G.

1~.

Dodge

.... - ..

S. H. H. Clark

John Sharp

----

1Railway Review, January 31, 1880, p. 51.
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TABLE XXIII
MISSOURI PACIFIC BOARD OF DIRECTORS-1880 (Consolidated Company). l
Jay Gould

Oliver Garrison

Sidney Di 11 on

D. K. Ferguson

Russell Sage

\~eb.

George J. Forrest

H. H. Clark

lvilliam F. Buckley

J. L. Stephens

Thomas T. Eckert

L. T. Smith

Fredrick L. Ames

1
Railway Review, August 2, 1880, p. 427.

11. Sammuel

-

--
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TABLE XXIV
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ST. LOUIS, I RON t~OUNTAIN & SOUTHERN BOARD OF DI RECTORS-1881 1
Jay Gould

Sidney Di 11 on

Henry C. Narquand

Samuel Shethar

Henry Hhe 1en

Thomas T. Eckert

Russell Sage

George B. McClellan

Joseph S. Lowry

Rufus J. Lockland

John T. Tery

-

R. C. Kerns

-==

1

Railway

Revie~1,

March 5, 1881, p. 120
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TABLE XXV
""~---

MISSOURI PACIFIC BOARD OF DIRECTORS-18811
Jay Gould

Fredrick L. Ames

Russell Sage

D. K. Ferguson

Sidney Di 11 on

i/eb

Hilliam F. Buckley

S . H. H. Cl ark

Thomas T. Eckert

Joseph L. Stephens

George F. Forrest

L. T. Smith

~1.

Samue 1

Samuel Sloan

1

Railway Review, r1arch 5, 1881, p. 130.

-
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TABLE XXVI
t4ISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS BOARD OF DIRECTORS-1881 l
Jay Gould

Thomas W. Pearsall

Sidney Di 11 on

Fredrick L. Ames

G. J. Forrest

Frank

Thomas T. Eckert

T. s. Hays

M. S.

~1cCready

A. G. Dulman

s.

Bond

C. H. Pratt
Judge David Kelso

Samuel Sloan

1Railway Review, Hay 21, 1881, p. 282.
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TABLE XXVII
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TEXAS & PACIFIC BOARD OF DIRECTORS-18821
Jay Gaul d

H.

~1.

Hoxie

s.

R.

s.

Hayes

T. Walters

Russ en Sage

T. T. Eckert

Jas. P. Scott

A. L. Hopkins

vi. c.

Hall

E.

H. Perkins, ,Jr.

T. S. Bond

E.

B.

Charles 0. Baird

D. Fe ·r sen he 1d

Fredrick L. Ames

George J. Gould

~lhee 1ock

J. C. Brown

1

Railway

Revie~1,

September 16, 1882, p. 531.
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CORPORATE PYR.llJ1I D FOR PROPOSED
HESTE RN RAIL SYSTD1 ·

t'1ississippi River
Corporation
$190 Million in
Assets

..

..

Missouri Pacific
Railroad Company

I--

Texas & Pacific
Rai 1way Company

$1.3 Billion in
Asset ·

..

Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe R.R.
$1.8 Billion in
Assets

----

